"Shmaryahu b. Chanoch" > wrote in message
...
> F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
> Fort Worth Star-Telegram | April 26, 2006
>
> The maiden flight of the first F-35 joint strike fighter prototype is
> still
> months away, and Lockheed Martin's giant development program is already
> generating budget-busting headlines.
>
> Pentagon officials, in their most recent estimate of major weapons system
> costs,
> projected a $276.5 billion cost for developing the F-35 and purchasing
> 2,500 of
> the planes for the U.S. and British armed forces.
>
> That's $20 billion more than the last estimate, in January 2004, and about
> a $75
> billion increase since the program was launched in October 2001.
>
> Skeptics in and out of government fear that it may not be the last big
> cost
> increase because the F-35 is still in its infancy and much remains to be
> done to
> develop and perfect the warplane's high-tech systems.
>
> The question that continues to loom over the F-35 program and prime
> contractor
> Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. is whether, unlike so many other programs
> including Lockheed's F-22, the JSF can be delivered without encountering
> major
> technical problems, long delays and huge cost overruns.
>
> Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog Government Accountability
> Office
> recently urged Congress to keep a tight rein on F-35 spending until
> Lockheed and
> the other contractors show that they can design and build the airplane and
> meet
> performance and cost goals.
>
> Michael Sullivan, the GAO's acquisition analyst, is concerned that the
> program
> is attempting to do too much too fast. Congress has already appropriated
> funding
> to begin work on the first seven "production" airplanes even though basic
> flight
> testing of a "production representative" airplane won't occur until 2008
> at the
> earliest.
>
> "Our message is they still have a lot of risks in these things until they
> fly
> the airplane," Sullivan said in an interview last week. "There are
> technologies
> they're counting on that have not been tested yet."
>
> Lockheed spokesman John Smith said some of the assumptions behind the
> recent
> cost estimate and pessimistic forecasts do not "recognize lessons that the
> F-35
> has learned from the problems of those other programs" and assumes that
> the same
> mistakes and problems will arise again.
>
> Program and Lockheed officials say the first flight of the first test
> aircraft
> will likely take place in west Fort Worth sometime between late August and
> early
> October.
>
> "I've told everyone we'll work to August [flight date], but we'll fly when
> we're
> ready," said Rear Adm. Steven Enewold, the top military official
> overseeing the
> program. "We don't want to rush to make a first flight and then have
> something
> bad happen."
>
> Enewold acknowledged in a telephone interview last week that there are
> many
> questions yet to be answered and probably some questions that aren't even
> known
> yet. But he said he is reasonably confident that the F-35 program is on
> track to
> deliver mission-capable fighters beginning in 2011.
>
> How confident?
>
> "I'm fairly comfortable through first flight and through the end of this
> year,"
> Enewold said. "After that, the risks [of encountering major technical
> obstacles]
> get bigger."
>
> After recently conducted design reviews, Enewold said indications are that
> the
> contractors can successfully manufacture the critical parts and components
> needed for the test planes and early production aircraft, and "we're not
> going
> to have to do a bunch of scrap and rework." He said there has been
> "demonstrable
> progress in the delivery of hardware and systems" to laboratories for
> testing
> and certification.
>
> The recent Pentagon estimates attributed most of the expected cost
> increases to
> rising costs of metals and other materials and higher inflation
> predictions.
>
> "We're seeing 200 percent increases in aluminum, 500 percent in titanium,"
> Enewold said. "That's a big issue."
>
> But the GAO, in reports and testimony before Congress, says the real
> danger of
> huge cost increases lies in the program's plans to begin building
> production
> airplanes before most of the flight testing is done on all three versions
> of the
> F-35.
>
> Being forced to stop production midstream to make design changes, as
> Sullivan
> says has happened in many other programs, "is a huge driver of costs."
>
> The program should wait at least another year, preferably two, Sullivan
> said,
> and complete plenty of flight tests before beginning to build the first
> production aircraft.
>
> "To us, it's measure twice, cut once," Sullivan said.
>
> Program and Lockheed officials as well as other experts say that would
> take too
> long and also drive up costs.
>
> "The problem with that reasoning is we don't have a half-century to field
> a
> next-generation fighter," said Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute,
> a
> defense think tank. "Slowing down is just another way of spending money."
>
> Smith, the Lockheed spokesman, said the F-35 "possesses very high levels
> of
> technical maturity and extremely low levels of technical risk for a
> fighter at
> this stage of its development," as shown by the recent successful design
> review.
> "Much of the F-35's technical risk will be reduced before flight testing
> begins."
>
> Every step taken in the F-35 program, Smith said, is done with the goal of
> maintaining the airplane at a price U.S. and other armed forces can
> afford.
>
> The F-35 program, Enewold insists, is proceeding on a deliberate basis
> with
> plenty of opportunity for government officials to slow the process down
> and make
> corrections if major problems arise.
>
> "We're going to go to an acquisition review to get permission to spend
> production money every year until 2013," Enewold said.
>
> http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
>
> How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
> year
> back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?


>
>
>
>
> "If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
> didn't."

> > http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
> >
> > How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
> > year
> > back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>
> You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
force into target practice.

>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > "If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
> > didn't."

On Thu, 27 Apr 2006 04:32:10 GMT, Seawolf wrote:

> You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

You didn't really just quote that entire post only to add one line, did
you?

--

-Jeff B.
zoomie at fastmail dot fm

buff82driver wrote:
>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
>>>
>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
>>>year
>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>
>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>
> Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
> thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
> parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
> ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
> ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
> a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
> plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
> engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
> If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
> force into target practice.
>
And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
hell of a contribution...
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>"If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
>>>didn't."
>
>

Ricardo > wrote in
.uk:

>
>
> buff82driver wrote:
>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
>>>>
>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>within one year
>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>
>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>
>> Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>> has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
>> tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
>> ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the
>> big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>> sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>> era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>> need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>> solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S. would
>> not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>
> And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
> hell of a contribution...


IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception of the
P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a rather
lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until the later
addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting) airframe
modifications that made it great.

DS

DeepSea wrote:
> Ricardo > wrote in
> .uk:
>
>
>>
>>buff82driver wrote:
>>
>>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
>>>>>
>>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>>within one year
>>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>>
>>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>>
>>>Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>>>has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
>>>tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
>>>ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the
>>>big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>>>sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>>>era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>>>need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>>>solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S. would
>>>not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>>
>>
>>And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
>>hell of a contribution...
>
>
>
> IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception of the
> P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a rather
> lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until the later
> addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting) airframe
> modifications that made it great.
>
> DS

Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the British
Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the purchase of the
Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas on
the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
average, the main concern from the British point of view being
performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
had considerable merit at low altitude.

And the rest, as we say, is history...

Ricardo

In article >, Ricardo
> wrote:

> buff82driver wrote:
> >>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-bz.nl
> >>>
> >>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
> >>>year
> >>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
> >>
> >>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
> >
> > Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
> > thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
> > parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
> > ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
> > ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
> > a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
> > plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
> > engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
> > If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
> > force into target practice.
> >
> And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
> hell of a contribution...

Complex technology, etc. are not the issue here.

The real issue, the point of the debate and the article is project management
philosophy.

On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
off the production line from the get-go.

On the other side is the "new" project management philosophy (actually
very old) , now called spiral development, where you get a production version
flying asap and sequentially modify it as necessary based on continuing
flight test plus service experience.

There are costs associated with both philosophies. Costs to make changes
versus costs of keeping a large engineering team twiddling their thumbs
during flight test .

Politically, spiral development is much safer. You have the aircraft flying and
you can point to your successes: much less chance of having the program
cancelled since there are aircraft in the fleet.

Sprial development was out of favor for awhile because some programs
screwed the pooch and thought they could push some critical testing off
to later production versions. It ended up biting them in the ass.

F-22 did not ustilise spiral development, and look how long it took them to
go through flight test, how much it cost the program and the taxpayers, how
many aircraft were deleted as a result, and how many times the program
was almost axed.
Overspec'ing the initial development of a product gives every nitwit an
opportunity to point fingers if things do not go perfectly. And professional
politicians are not aerospace engineers, and most don't have any technical
background at all.

Omega's P-51 question is thus answered: they did it by getting the basic
aircraft flying and in service, then making literally dozens of model and sub-
model configuration changes over the next 4 years until the war was over.

I.e. Spiral Development.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Harry Andreas wrote:
>On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
>Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
>line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
>off the production line from the get-go.

Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
while project management was pressing for a finished product.

The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
fighter availability and maintenance costs.

Mvh,
Jon K

>
> Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
> time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
> have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
> while project management was pressing for a finished product.
>
> The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
> a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
> minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
> fighter availability and maintenance costs.
So if spiral development was used we would be a few versions into the
F-22 already being it would have entered service back in the early to
mid 90's and in the end the overall cost per plane would be much lower
as production scaled up. I'm sure the end of the Cold War had a lot to
do with the delaying of the F-22 project being a lot of the prelim work
had been done in the 80's when the AF voiced the need for a post F-15
air superiority fighter. Think about how glad Russia and China most be
that we delayed the F-22 so long they would not have to deal with the
F-22 threat for about an extra decade. In the meantime we have given
Russia a lot of time to come up with their own stealth aircraft and
counter-stealth technology whatever that may mean. We would also
already have a large lead towards an even more advanced fighter/UCAV to
enter service in the 2015-2020 time-frame. Now for the F-22 to be cost
effective its going to have to be around till 2025 and later being
production has jsut started and would be spread out over several years.
Talk about ****ing away a grand opportunity to truly leave Russia in
the dust with regard to generations ahead of them in fighter tech vs.
Cold War B.S. about how much better we were. We were better but a lot
of that was training being we were not flying against trained Russian
pilots but shotty 3rd world air forces with a few Ruskies in the mix to
add some flavor to the engagements.

In article . com>,
wrote:

> Harry Andreas wrote:
> >On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
> >Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
> >line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
> >off the production line from the get-go.
>
> Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
> time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
> have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
> while project management was pressing for a finished product.

Just goes to show that there are factions within USG just as there are
factions everywhere.


> The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
> a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
> minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
> fighter availability and maintenance costs.

And yet the article makes a case for waiting...

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Ricardo > wrote in
:

>
>
> DeepSea wrote:
>> Ricardo > wrote in
>> .uk:
>>
>>
>>>
>>>buff82driver wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-
bz.
>>>>>>nl
>>>>>>
>>>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>>>within one year
>>>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>>>
>>>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>>>
>>>>Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>>>>has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
>>>>tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into
>>>>the ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were
>>>>the big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>>>>sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>>>>era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>>>>need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>>>>solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S.
>>>>would not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>>>
>>>
>>>And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made
>>>one hell of a contribution...
>>
>>
>>
>> IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception
>> of the P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a
>> rather lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until
>> the later addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting)
>> airframe modifications that made it great.
>>
>> DS
>
> Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
> its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the
> British Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the
> purchase of the
> Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
> frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas on
> the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
> time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
> average, the main concern from the British point of view being
> performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
> had considerable merit at low altitude.


That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is what gave
the P-51 its start. The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff, most
of the bombing against England was dive bombing, and the Brits already
had an outstanding all-around fighter in the Spitfire. What was the
Ministry's concern over high altitude performance?


DS

"DeepSea" > wrote in message
. 136...

snip
>
> > .... . The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff, _most_
> of the bombing _against England was dive bombing_,

Really? Please define _most_ and _dive_ bombing, in your statement.
FWIW, AIUI, _Dive_ bombers were used against the Chain Home sites at the
beginning of the Luftwaffe's Bombing campaign - and against such defined
sites the dive bombers would have been an appropriate resource to task, but
AFAIK the bombing campaigns against Liverpool, Coventry, Plymouth,
Portsmouth, Southampton, London et.al were carried out at night by waves of
'level' bombers. Your information may of course be more accurate - I await
your disclosures with interest.
BTW; as you specifically mentioned 'England', I've not addressed the
question of whether dive-bombers were used against Scotland, Northern
Ireland and/or Wales.

--

Brian

DeepSea wrote:
> Ricardo > wrote in
> :
>
>
>>
>>DeepSea wrote:
>>
>>>Ricardo > wrote in
.uk:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>buff82driver wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-
>
> bz.
>
>>>>>>>nl
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>>>>within one year
>>>>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>>>>
>>>>>Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>>>>>has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
>>>>>tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into
>>>>>the ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were
>>>>>the big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>>>>>sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>>>>>era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>>>>>need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>>>>>solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S.
>>>>>would not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made
>>>>one hell of a contribution...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception
>>>of the P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a
>>>rather lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until
>>>the later addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting)
>>>airframe modifications that made it great.
>>>
>>>DS
>>
>>Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
>>its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the
>>British Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the
>>purchase of the
>> Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
>>frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas on
>>the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
>>time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
>>average, the main concern from the British point of view being
>>performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
>>had considerable merit at low altitude.
>
>
>
> That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is what gave
> the P-51 its start. The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff, most
> of the bombing against England was dive bombing, and the Brits already
> had an outstanding all-around fighter in the Spitfire. What was the
> Ministry's concern over high altitude performance?
>
>
> DS

The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive bombing
was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition the
dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
Spain and against the low countries of Europe.

Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and the
service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000
feet, and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet,
although operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless
height is a crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000 feet
above your enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive than
if you are 5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.

At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need was
for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on stream
that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.

Ricardo

"Brian Sharrock" > wrote in
:

>
> "DeepSea" > wrote in message
> . 136...
>
> snip
>>
>> > .... . The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff, _most_
>> of the bombing _against England was dive bombing_,
>
> Really? Please define _most_ and _dive_ bombing, in your statement.
> FWIW, AIUI, _Dive_ bombers were used against the Chain Home sites at
> the beginning of the Luftwaffe's Bombing campaign - and against such
> defined sites the dive bombers would have been an appropriate resource
> to task, but AFAIK the bombing campaigns against Liverpool, Coventry,
> Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, London et.al were carried out at
> night by waves of 'level' bombers. Your information may of course be
> more accurate - I await your disclosures with interest.

Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.

Most - (significantly) more than half

Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
speed/low altitude.

My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk. Over the course of
about an hour and ten minutes, he described being on the recieving end
of the German strikes. He only saw "level" bombing on one occasion
(directed at an area target), but at a relatively low level, estimated
to be less than 10,000 feet, and at night.



> BTW; as you specifically mentioned 'England', I've not addressed the
> question of whether dive-bombers were used against Scotland, Northern
> Ireland and/or Wales.

I have no knowledge of bombings against Scotland, Northern
> Ireland and/or Wales whatsoever - any insights you have would be
appreciated.

DS

Ricardo > wrote in news:2bk4g.45435$xt.43024
@fe3.news.blueyonder.co.uk:

>
>
> DeepSea wrote:
>> Ricardo > wrote in
>> :
>>
>>
>>>
>>>DeepSea wrote:
>>>
>>>>Ricardo > wrote in
.uk:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>buff82driver wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-
>>
>> bz.
>>
>>>>>>>>nl
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>>>>>within one year
>>>>>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>>>>>>has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of
very
>>>>>>tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into
>>>>>>the ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things
were
>>>>>>the big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>>>>>>sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>>>>>>era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>>>>>>need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>>>>>>solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S.
>>>>>>would not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made
>>>>>one hell of a contribution...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception
>>>>of the P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a
>>>>rather lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until
>>>>the later addition of the British engine and a couple of
(supporting)
>>>>airframe modifications that made it great.
>>>>
>>>>DS
>>>
>>>Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
>>>its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the
>>>British Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the
>>>purchase of the
>>> Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
>>>frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas
on
>>>the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
>>>time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
>>>average, the main concern from the British point of view being
>>>performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
>>>had considerable merit at low altitude.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is what
gave
>> the P-51 its start. The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff,
most
>> of the bombing against England was dive bombing, and the Brits
already
>> had an outstanding all-around fighter in the Spitfire. What was the
>> Ministry's concern over high altitude performance?
>>
>>
>> DS
>
> The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive
bombing
> was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition
the
> dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
> Spain and against the low countries of Europe.
>
> Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and
the
> service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000
> feet, and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet,
> although operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless
> height is a crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000
feet
> above your enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive
than
> if you are 5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.
>
> At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need
was
> for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
> American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on
stream
> that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
> built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.
>
> Ricardo

Can you recommend any British primary source, or at least British
authored material detailing the events leading to P-51 development. I
find it very interesting that the development of one of the US's best
pieces of military hardware grew out of a (rather desperate) British
requirement.

DS

DeepSea wrote:
> Ricardo > wrote in news:2bk4g.45435$xt.43024
> @fe3.news.blueyonder.co.uk:
>
>
>>
>>DeepSea wrote:
>>
>>>Ricardo > wrote in
:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>DeepSea wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Ricardo > wrote in
.uk:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>buff82driver wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,95440,00.html?ESRC=dod-
>>>
>>>bz.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>>>>nl
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
>>>>>>>>>within one year
>>>>>>>>>back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
>>>>>>>has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of
>
> very
>
>>>>>>>tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into
>>>>>>>the ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things
>
> were
>
>>>>>>>the big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
>>>>>>>sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
>>>>>>>era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
>>>>>>>need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
>>>>>>>solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S.
>>>>>>>would not make everyone else's air force into target practice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made
>>>>>>one hell of a contribution...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception
>>>>>of the P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a
>>>>>rather lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until
>>>>>the later addition of the British engine and a couple of
>
> (supporting)
>
>>>>>airframe modifications that made it great.
>>>>>
>>>>>DS
>>>>
>>>>Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
>>>>its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the
>>>>British Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the
>>>>purchase of the
>>>> Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
>>>>frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas
>
> on
>
>>>>the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
>>>>time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
>>>>average, the main concern from the British point of view being
>>>>performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
>>>>had considerable merit at low altitude.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is what
>
> gave
>
>>>the P-51 its start. The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff,
>
> most
>
>>>of the bombing against England was dive bombing, and the Brits
>
> already
>
>>>had an outstanding all-around fighter in the Spitfire. What was the
>>>Ministry's concern over high altitude performance?
>>>
>>>
>>>DS
>>
>>The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive
>
> bombing
>
>>was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition
>
> the
>
>>dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
>>Spain and against the low countries of Europe.
>>
>>Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and
>
> the
>
>>service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000
>>feet, and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet,
>>although operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless
>>height is a crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000
>
> feet
>
>>above your enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive
>
> than
>
>>if you are 5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.
>>
>>At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need
>
> was
>
>>for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
>>American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on
>
> stream
>
>>that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
>>built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.
>>
>>Ricardo
>
>
> Can you recommend any British primary source, or at least British
> authored material detailing the events leading to P-51 development. I
> find it very interesting that the development of one of the US's best
> pieces of military hardware grew out of a (rather desperate) British
> requirement.
>
> DS

Hi DS,

I'm afraid I can't pinpoint any specific British source about the early
days, but try the sites shown here where you will find a lot of
interesting information - not least about US attitudes at that time. The
Wikipedia summary under 'genesis' is probably the best with regard to
British involvement.

The book 'Classic Aircraft Fighters' by Bill Gunston, ISBN 0 600 349950
- 1978 - also gives useful information.

http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap9.htm
http://www.geocities.com/koala51d/
http://www.aviation-history.com/north-american/p51.html
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/p51.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-51_Mustang#Genesis
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p51_1.html

Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard built Merlin,
whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels of the Rolls Royce
version. This, it is claimed, was because the British kept secret the
composition of the phosphor-bronze bearings that they used in the
engine. No, I can't quote a source/s.

I hope this helps.

Ricardo

In article >, Ricardo
> wrote:

> The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive bombing
> was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition the
> dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
> Spain and against the low countries of Europe.
>
> Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and the
> service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000
> feet, and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet,
> although operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless
> height is a crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000 feet
> above your enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive than
> if you are 5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.


Ricardo, I believe that your figures are uniformly 10,000 feet too high.
All the reports that I've read for the BoB mention the bombers coming in
between 15 and 20 thousand with fighter cover about 5 thousand higher.
After the BoB altitudes went higher, that was one of the lessons learned.


> At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need was
> for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
> American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on stream
> that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
> built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.

Yet the Mustang I's equipped a large number of squadrons.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In article >, DeepSea
> wrote:

> Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
> speed/low altitude.

High speed/low altitude is not what dive bombing is all about.
Speed and altitude are residuals of the dive bombing process.
Dive bombing is getting the aircraft "pointed" at the target,
necessitating a dive. The bomb is released in the dive and the a/c pulls away.
High speed is not a requirement, and as practiced in WWII, not even wanted.
Hence the addition of dive (speed) brakes on the A-36 version of the Mustang.
After bomb release, the aircraft is at a lower altitude, but only by necessity.


> My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
> Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
> corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
> Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
> rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
> terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk. Over the course of
> about an hour and ten minutes, he described being on the recieving end
> of the German strikes. He only saw "level" bombing on one occasion
> (directed at an area target), but at a relatively low level, estimated
> to be less than 10,000 feet, and at night.

You were very lucky to have been able to attend such a rare event.
Those veterns are rapidly dying. I hope the interview was taped.

cheers

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:16:27 -0500, DeepSea >
wrote:

>Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
>history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.
>
>Most - (significantly) more than half
>
>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>speed/low altitude.
>
>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
>Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk.

OK, if you are an engineer, then you should start by considering that
a "corporal" courier who was wounded by a dive bomber is probably not
authoritative on what dive bombing is all about.

Now, take your engineering prowess and consider the geometry of level
versus high angle release of a bomb--by diving at the target (in the
simplest iteration) you reduce the aircraft's travel over the ground
and hence increase the accuracy.

If you wish to go to higher levels of math, you need to consider dive
angle, airspeed, bank, sight depression from flight path, wind drift
both before and after release (aircraft first then bomb),
accelerations (g-loads), aerodynamic drag of bomb and a few other
things to begin to get what dive bombing is about.

But, don't ask corporals--they may know something about their
particular field, but it may not be dive bombing.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Harry Andreas wrote:
> In article >, Ricardo
> > wrote:
>
>
>>The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive bombing
>>was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition the
>>dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
>>Spain and against the low countries of Europe.
>>
>>Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and the
>>service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000
>>feet, and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet,
>>although operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless
>>height is a crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000 feet
>>above your enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive than
>>if you are 5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.
>
>
>
> Ricardo, I believe that your figures are uniformly 10,000 feet too high.
> All the reports that I've read for the BoB mention the bombers coming in
> between 15 and 20 thousand with fighter cover about 5 thousand higher.
> After the BoB altitudes went higher, that was one of the lessons learned.
>
>
>
>>At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need was
>>for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
>>American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on stream
>>that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
>>built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.
>
>
> Yet the Mustang I's equipped a large number of squadrons.
>
Hi Harry,

I was quoting the maximum operating heights for the categories of
aircraft but concede that much of the action took place at lower level.

The Mustang was not a participant in the Battle of Britain and, as far
as I'm aware was used for 'army liaison duties' with the Army
Co-operation Command which was established in December 1940 and also
with the Combined Operations Unit. The first Mustang to arrive was on 24
october 1941.

Ricardo

Harry Andreas wrote:
> In article >, DeepSea
> > wrote:
>
>
>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>speed/low altitude.
>
>
> High speed/low altitude is not what dive bombing is all about.
> Speed and altitude are residuals of the dive bombing process.
> Dive bombing is getting the aircraft "pointed" at the target,
> necessitating a dive. The bomb is released in the dive and the a/c pulls away.
> High speed is not a requirement, and as practiced in WWII, not even wanted.
> Hence the addition of dive (speed) brakes on the A-36 version of the Mustang.
> After bomb release, the aircraft is at a lower altitude, but only by necessity.
>
>
>
>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
>>Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk. Over the course of
>>about an hour and ten minutes, he described being on the recieving end
>>of the German strikes. He only saw "level" bombing on one occasion
>>(directed at an area target), but at a relatively low level, estimated
>>to be less than 10,000 feet, and at night.
>
>
> You were very lucky to have been able to attend such a rare event.
> Those veterns are rapidly dying. I hope the interview was taped.
>
> cheers
>
What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?

Cheers,

Ricardo

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:16:27 -0500, DeepSea >
> wrote:
>
>>Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
>>history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.
>>
>>Most - (significantly) more than half
>>
>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>speed/low altitude.
>>
>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
>>Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk.

So you extrapolated from one man's experience the assumption that _most_
bombing of England(sic) was performed bt _Dive-bombers_?

>
> OK, if you are an engineer, then you should start by considering that
> a "corporal" courier who was wounded by a dive bomber is probably not
> authoritative on what dive bombing is all about.
>
> Now, take your engineering prowess and consider the geometry of level
> versus high angle release of a bomb--by diving at the target (in the
> simplest iteration) you reduce the aircraft's travel over the ground
> and hence increase the accuracy.
>
> If you wish to go to higher levels of math, you need to consider dive
> angle, airspeed, bank, sight depression from flight path, wind drift
> both before and after release (aircraft first then bomb),
> accelerations (g-loads), aerodynamic drag of bomb and a few other
> things to begin to get what dive bombing is about.
>
> But, don't ask corporals--they may know something about their
> particular field, but it may not be dive bombing.
>
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com


I concur with Ed Rasimus's comments above... :)
It could be that the 'British Army Courier Corporal' - interesting that no
Regiment or Corps was cited - did actually experience situations where
_most_ of the _bombing_
was by dive-bombers. This was not the experience of the majority (=
significantly more than half) of the British population suffering from the
'Blitz' on cities. {Isn't there a saying about one swallow not making a
summer? Perhaps one Corporal's anecdotes do not a form a basis for a
deduction}.

The experiences endured by my mother and her neighbours {most of the menfolk
were on active service} is summarised on the Liverpool blitz web-site
http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/nof/blitz/index.html

<extract>
The seven nights of the 1941 May Blitz (1st-7th May) were the heaviest
consecutive nights of bombing experienced by Liverpool during the whole of
the Second World War. In those few nights around 681 planes dropped 870
tonnes of high explosives and over 112,000 incendiaries (firebombs) on the
area, killing over 1,700 people and making around 76,000 homeless.

</extract>

Not much mention of Dive Bombers there! The Luftwaffe _did_ have
Dive-Bombers, these were aircraft specifically designed for
Close-Air-Support of advancing troops and AIUI such aircraft were directed
by their pilots along a line-of-sight towards their target; the aircraft's
systems automagically performed a J-curve manoeuvre which had the effect of
taking the aircraft away and above the target while the ordnance continued
along the line-of-sight to impact. Such aircraft were tasked against known
targets, predominantly the Chain Home stations and airfields. AIUI, the
aircraft-weapon systems was a success but not many Teutonic aircrew made a
second sortie.

--



Brian

"Ricardo" > wrote in message
o.uk...
>
>
> Harry Andreas wrote:
>> In article >, DeepSea
>> > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>>speed/low altitude.
>>
>>
>> High speed/low altitude is not what dive bombing is all about.
>> Speed and altitude are residuals of the dive bombing process.
>> Dive bombing is getting the aircraft "pointed" at the target,
>> necessitating a dive. The bomb is released in the dive and the a/c pulls
>> away.
>> High speed is not a requirement, and as practiced in WWII, not even
>> wanted.
>> Hence the addition of dive (speed) brakes on the A-36 version of the
>> Mustang.
>> After bomb release, the aircraft is at a lower altitude, but only by
>> necessity.
>>
>>
>>
>>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
>>>Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the rest
>>>of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the terms
>>>"most" and "dive bombing" during his talk. Over the course of about an
>>>hour and ten minutes, he described being on the recieving end of the
>>>German strikes. He only saw "level" bombing on one occasion (directed at
>>>an area target), but at a relatively low level, estimated to be less than
>>>10,000 feet, and at night.
>>
>>
>> You were very lucky to have been able to attend such a rare event.
>> Those veterns are rapidly dying. I hope the interview was taped.
>>
>> cheers
>>
> What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?

Dedicated ground attack/dive bomber variant. See:

http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p51_6.html

Brooks

>
> Cheers,
>
> Ricardo

In article >,
Ricardo > wrote:

> What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?

In brief, a dive bomber based on the early P-51 airframe, officially
named "Apache".

- Three-blade rather than four-blade prop.

- Allison V-1710 engine, rather than Allison Merlin, as used in
original Mustang.

- Dive brakes included on inboard underside of wings, similar to
Douglas Dauntless.

About 500 made, used mostly in CBI and Mediterranean/North African
theaters.

The Collings Foundation is restoring one in Florida.

"Ricardo" > wrote in message
k...
>
>
> Harry Andreas wrote:
>> In article >, Ricardo
>> > wrote:
>>
>>
>>>The initial air assaults on Britain dispelled the myth that dive bombing
>>>was the way forward as in the face of determined fighter opposition the
>>>dive bombers did not fare too well - despite how well it had done in
>>>Spain and against the low countries of Europe.
>>>
>>>Conventional bombing was more the norm for the Battle of Britain and the
>>>service ceiling of the German bombers was between 25,000 and 30,000 feet,
>>>and for their escorting fighters between 35,000 and 40,000 feet, although
>>>operationally they were likely to be a lot lower. Nonetheless height is a
>>>crucial factor in aerial warfare and if you are 10,000 feet above your
>>>enemy you are more likely to inflict damage and survive than if you are
>>>5,000 feet below him and desperately climbing to reach him.
>>
>>
>>
>> Ricardo, I believe that your figures are uniformly 10,000 feet too
>> high.
>> All the reports that I've read for the BoB mention the bombers coming in
>> between 15 and 20 thousand with fighter cover about 5 thousand higher.
>> After the BoB altitudes went higher, that was one of the lessons learned.
>>
>>
>>
>>>At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need was
>>>for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
>>>American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on stream
>>>that particular battle was virtually over, allied with which British
>>>built fighter production had gained considerable momentum.
>>
>>
>> Yet the Mustang I's equipped a large number of squadrons.
>>
> Hi Harry,
>
> I was quoting the maximum operating heights for the categories of
> aircraft but concede that much of the action took place at lower level.
>
> The Mustang was not a participant in the Battle of Britain and, as far
> as I'm aware was used for 'army liaison duties' with the Army
> Co-operation Command which was established in December 1940 and also with
> the Combined Operations Unit.

Only true in regards to the Mustang I and IA; the later Mustang III served
with a number of RAF units in the (primarily) air-to-air fighter role and
performed escort for both USAAF and RAF bombing missions. P-51D/K variants
served with the RAF for a couple of years after the war was over.

Brooks
The first Mustang to arrive was on 24
> october 1941.
>
> Ricardo

Ed Rasimus > wrote in
:

> On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:16:27 -0500, DeepSea >
> wrote:
>
>>Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
>>history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.
>>
>>Most - (significantly) more than half
>>
>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>speed/low altitude.
>>
>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the
US
>>Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk.
>
> OK, if you are an engineer, then you should start by considering that
> a "corporal" courier who was wounded by a dive bomber is probably not
> authoritative on what dive bombing is all about.

The discussion was not about "what dive bombing is all about", the
technicalities or merits of dive bombing, nor was the talk. Simply that
in his experience, he mostly saw dive bombing. This was important to my
point of view because his talk was my only exposure to primary source
material on the subject (at least until Brian posted the weblink).



>
> Now, take your engineering prowess and consider the geometry of level
> versus high angle release of a bomb--by diving at the target (in the
> simplest iteration) you reduce the aircraft's travel over the ground
> and hence increase the accuracy.
>
> If you wish to go to higher levels of math, you need to consider dive
> angle, airspeed, bank, sight depression from flight path, wind drift
> both before and after release (aircraft first then bomb),
> accelerations (g-loads), aerodynamic drag of bomb and a few other
> things to begin to get what dive bombing is about.
>
> But, don't ask corporals--they may know something about their
> particular field, but it may not be dive bombing.

The question was never posed - to the corporal or this group (at least
by me). Again, my discussion with Ricardo had nothing to do with how
dive bombing was supposed to work, or even if it worked; only that it
did occur and in what relative proportion to other types of bombing
procedures used by the Germans during the Battle of Britain. I'm
reasonably certain that an expert's knowledge and experience was not
required to tell the difference between dive bombing and high altitude
"level" bombing, at least as practiced during the Battle of Britain. In
any event, your input of related information is noted and appreciated.

DS





>
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
>

"Brian Sharrock" > wrote in
:

>
> "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
>> On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:16:27 -0500, DeepSea >
>> wrote:
>>
>>>Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
>>>history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.
>>>
>>>Most - (significantly) more than half
>>>
>>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>>speed/low altitude.
>>>
>>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the
>>>US Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>>>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>>>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk.
>
> So you extrapolated from one man's experience the assumption that
> _most_ bombing of England(sic) was performed bt _Dive-bombers_?

When that and a few pictures/supporting text of the BoB found in US
history books are all you have to go on, its not that far of a reach.


>> OK, if you are an engineer, then you should start by considering that
>> a "corporal" courier who was wounded by a dive bomber is probably not
>> authoritative on what dive bombing is all about.
>>
>> Now, take your engineering prowess and consider the geometry of level
>> versus high angle release of a bomb--by diving at the target (in the
>> simplest iteration) you reduce the aircraft's travel over the ground
>> and hence increase the accuracy.
>>
>> If you wish to go to higher levels of math, you need to consider dive
>> angle, airspeed, bank, sight depression from flight path, wind drift
>> both before and after release (aircraft first then bomb),
>> accelerations (g-loads), aerodynamic drag of bomb and a few other
>> things to begin to get what dive bombing is about.
>>
>> But, don't ask corporals--they may know something about their
>> particular field, but it may not be dive bombing.
>>
>>
>>
>> Ed Rasimus
>> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>> "When Thunder Rolled"
>> www.thunderchief.org
>> www.thundertales.blogspot.com
>
>
> I concur with Ed Rasimus's comments above... :)
> It could be that the 'British Army Courier Corporal' - interesting
> that no Regiment or Corps was cited - did actually experience
> situations where _most_ of the _bombing_
> was by dive-bombers. This was not the experience of the majority (=
> significantly more than half) of the British population suffering from
> the 'Blitz' on cities. {Isn't there a saying about one swallow not
> making a summer? Perhaps one Corporal's anecdotes do not a form a
> basis for a deduction}.

Apparently not.


>
> The experiences endured by my mother and her neighbours {most of the
> menfolk were on active service} is summarised on the Liverpool blitz
> web-site http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/nof/blitz/index.html
>
> <extract>
> The seven nights of the 1941 May Blitz (1st-7th May) were the heaviest
> consecutive nights of bombing experienced by Liverpool during the
> whole of the Second World War. In those few nights around 681 planes
> dropped 870 tonnes of high explosives and over 112,000 incendiaries
> (firebombs) on the area, killing over 1,700 people and making around
> 76,000 homeless.
>
> </extract>
>
> Not much mention of Dive Bombers there! The Luftwaffe _did_ have
> Dive-Bombers, these were aircraft specifically designed for
> Close-Air-Support of advancing troops and AIUI such aircraft were
> directed by their pilots along a line-of-sight towards their target;
> the aircraft's systems automagically performed a J-curve manoeuvre
> which had the effect of taking the aircraft away and above the target
> while the ordnance continued along the line-of-sight to impact. Such
> aircraft were tasked against known targets, predominantly the Chain
> Home stations and airfields. AIUI, the aircraft-weapon systems was a
> success but not many Teutonic aircrew made a second sortie.


That would explain the British complaint with the early P-51's lack of
high altitude performance. Based on the information I had, I (apparently
incorrectly) assumed that there was no need for a fighter with good high
altitude performance - I thought that most of the action during the BoB
was down low where the early P-51 was actually pretty capable.

Thanks for the education - and that weblink.

DS

On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 14:36:52 -0500, DeepSea >
wrote:

>Ed Rasimus > wrote in
:
>
>> On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 08:16:27 -0500, DeepSea >
>> wrote:
>>
>>>Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
>>>history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.

>>>Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
>>>speed/low altitude.
>>>
>>>My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the
>>>US Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
>>>corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
>>>Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
>>>rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
>>>terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk.
>>
>> OK, if you are an engineer, then you should start by considering that
>> a "corporal" courier who was wounded by a dive bomber is probably not
>> authoritative on what dive bombing is all about.
>
>The discussion was not about "what dive bombing is all about", the
>technicalities or merits of dive bombing, nor was the talk. Simply that
>in his experience, he mostly saw dive bombing. This was important to my
>point of view because his talk was my only exposure to primary source
>material on the subject (at least until Brian posted the weblink).

My point was the unusual nature of taking a general conclusion from a
very limited anecdotal sampling and one that was arguably not an
expert observer. It would be similar to taking testimony regarding an
individual who has been shot and extrapolating their experience to
some level of expertise in firearms.

If you were in attendance at "the US Army's General Staff College"
(can I assume you mean C&GSC?), then I would further assume a
professional military background and some exposure during your
educational background to some coverage of the Battle of Britain, the
blitz, and the bombing of London.

One could go a step further and, as Harry Andreas has pointed out,
"high speed/low altitude" is probably not the best characterization of
dive bombing either. Lay-down or skip-bombing display those attributes
more accurately.

Other than the oral history aspect of seeing a real live WW II British
Tommy, what was the point of his presentation at C&GSC? Was this part
of some larger program? Inquiring minds, etc. . . .

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

In message >, Ricardo
> writes
>Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard built Merlin,
>whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels of the Rolls Royce
>version. This, it is claimed, was because the British kept secret the
>composition of the phosphor-bronze bearings that they used in the
>engine. No, I can't quote a source/s.

On the other hand, I heard - from "old factory hands" lecturing on
manufacturing technique at Highbury College in 1988 - that a big
difference between Packard and Rolls-Royce was in fitting the cylinder
head.

Rolls-Royce used a precision hand-scraped metal-to-metal fit. Very
effective, though extremely demanding in scarce skilled labour.
(Attempting to 'file flat' is a useful exercise for a trainee mechanical
engineer; it teaches a certain humility in demanding surface finishes)

Packard cleaned up the castings, milled the mating faces approximately
flat (at least, compared to a metal-metal seal) and put a gasket between
them. I don't recall hearing tales of P-51s routinely or regularly
falling from the skies when their engines failed, nor of the Packard
Spitfires being execrated for unreliability (or, for that matter, lack
of horsepower).


--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article >,
(DeepSea) wrote:

> That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is
> what gave the P-51 its start.

At the time Britain was buying every fighter they could get
their hands on, including the Brewster Buffalo. British and
French purchasing gave a major boost to the US aircraft industry.
The first production orders for the Airacobra were from France.

Ken Young

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:

:In message >, Ricardo
> writes
:>Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard built Merlin,
:>whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels of the Rolls Royce
:>version. This, it is claimed, was because the British kept secret the
:>composition of the phosphor-bronze bearings that they used in the
:>engine. No, I can't quote a source/s.
:
:On the other hand, I heard - from "old factory hands" lecturing on
:manufacturing technique at Highbury College in 1988 - that a big
:difference between Packard and Rolls-Royce was in fitting the cylinder
:head.
:
:Rolls-Royce used a precision hand-scraped metal-to-metal fit. Very
:effective, though extremely demanding in scarce skilled labour.
:(Attempting to 'file flat' is a useful exercise for a trainee mechanical
:engineer; it teaches a certain humility in demanding surface finishes)
:
:Packard cleaned up the castings, milled the mating faces approximately
:flat (at least, compared to a metal-metal seal) and put a gasket between
:them. I don't recall hearing tales of P-51s routinely or regularly
:falling from the skies when their engines failed, nor of the Packard
:Spitfires being execrated for unreliability (or, for that matter, lack
:of horsepower).

Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.

--
"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
-- Charles Pinckney

In article >,
"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
>
> "Ricardo" > wrote in message
> k...
> >
> >
> > The Mustang was not a participant in the Battle of Britain and, as far
> > as I'm aware was used for 'army liaison duties' with the Army
> > Co-operation Command which was established in December 1940 and also with
> > the Combined Operations Unit.
>
> Only true in regards to the Mustang I and IA; the later Mustang III served
> with a number of RAF units in the (primarily) air-to-air fighter role and
> performed escort for both USAAF and RAF bombing missions. P-51D/K variants
> served with the RAF for a couple of years after the war was over.

A one-time manager of mine flew Spitfires with 485(NZ) Squadron,
including ground support post-D-Day. Near VE day, he was moved out to
start transistioning to the Mustang, they expected to move to the
Pacific, but VJ day fixed that.

He said the liked the Mustang the best of anything he flew, but he was
still glad he never had to "use" it.

In article >,
wrote:

> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.

Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.

Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
the early war versions.

"US folk" cranked out so much hardware because there were more of
us, we had more natural resources at hand, and we weren't being bombed.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In article >, DeepSea
> wrote:

> > Not much mention of Dive Bombers there! The Luftwaffe _did_ have
> > Dive-Bombers, these were aircraft specifically designed for
> > Close-Air-Support of advancing troops and AIUI such aircraft were
> > directed by their pilots along a line-of-sight towards their target;
> > the aircraft's systems automagically performed a J-curve manoeuvre
> > which had the effect of taking the aircraft away and above the target
> > while the ordnance continued along the line-of-sight to impact. Such
> > aircraft were tasked against known targets, predominantly the Chain
> > Home stations and airfields. AIUI, the aircraft-weapon systems was a
> > success but not many Teutonic aircrew made a second sortie.
>
>
> That would explain the British complaint with the early P-51's lack of
> high altitude performance. Based on the information I had, I (apparently
> incorrectly) assumed that there was no need for a fighter with good high
> altitude performance - I thought that most of the action during the BoB
> was down low where the early P-51 was actually pretty capable.

The RAF were understandably further ahead of the power curve than USAAC
with regards to what equipment was needed for the air battle.
They had the recent experience of BoB and previously BoF.

The German bombers came over in the mid-teens (probably due to oxygen
issues) with fighter cover that started out in the high teens, but as the
battles
progressed and each side sought the advantage, the fighter cover started
coming over in the low to mid-twenties.

Thus the race for better performing fighters at "high" altitude.

The USAAC was still stuck in the opinion that fighter battles would take place
in the mid-teens. This didn't change until the US entered the war.
That's why NAA had shown the Mustang I to the AAC with the Allison engine.
It performed well at the mid-teens. It's what the AAC asked for, and you
have to offer the customer what he wants.
The British took them that way out of necessity, with their eyes open, and
assigned them to roles that didn't require high altitude, until a fix
could be found.

The USAAC wan't that interested in the Mustang at first because they already
had several figher projects well underway (P-38, P-47).

WRT German dive bombing: the type most used for that was the JU-87 Stuka
and they were such dead meat for the RAF that the Luftwaffe stopped sending
them over early on in BoB.

cheers

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Steve Hix wrote:
> In article >,
> Ricardo > wrote:
>
>
>>What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?
>
>
> In brief, a dive bomber based on the early P-51 airframe, officially
> named "Apache".
>
> - Three-blade rather than four-blade prop.
>
> - Allison V-1710 engine, rather than Allison Merlin, as used in
> original Mustang.
>
> - Dive brakes included on inboard underside of wings, similar to
> Douglas Dauntless.
>
> About 500 made, used mostly in CBI and Mediterranean/North African
> theaters.
>
> The Collings Foundation is restoring one in Florida.

Thanks Steve,

Each day we learn a little more...

Ricardo

PS Allison Merlin? - I thought Packard were the boys for the Merlin
production. Here I'm going to learn something else...

On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 15:04:23 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >,
wrote:
>
>> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
>> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
>> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
>> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
>> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
>
>Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
>
>Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
>They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
>the early war versions.
>
>"US folk" cranked out so much hardware because there were more of
>us, we had more natural resources at hand, and we weren't being bombed.

And we kept a good handle on when 'good enough' was in fact good
enough.

In article >,
Ricardo > wrote:

> Steve Hix wrote:
> > In article >,
> > Ricardo > wrote:
> >
> >
> >>What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?
> >
> >
> > In brief, a dive bomber based on the early P-51 airframe, officially
> > named "Apache".
> >
> > - Three-blade rather than four-blade prop.
> >
> > - Allison V-1710 engine, rather than Allison Merlin, as used in
> > original Mustang.
> >
> > - Dive brakes included on inboard underside of wings, similar to
> > Douglas Dauntless.
> >
> > About 500 made, used mostly in CBI and Mediterranean/North African
> > theaters.
> >
> > The Collings Foundation is restoring one in Florida.
>
> Thanks Steve,
>
> Each day we learn a little more...
>
> Ricardo
>
> PS Allison Merlin? - I thought Packard were the boys for the Merlin
> production. Here I'm going to learn something else...

Duuuh. Packard is right.

I blame it on the poison oak what I got around my eyes currently.

Glasses are a *good* thing...

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> Packard cleaned up the castings, milled the mating faces approximately
> flat (at least, compared to a metal-metal seal) and put a gasket between
> them. I don't recall hearing tales of P-51s routinely or regularly
> falling from the skies when their engines failed, nor of the Packard
> Spitfires being execrated for unreliability (or, for that matter, lack
> of horsepower).

Uh, I don't know about "regularly falling," but here is the best
reference I could find (skip down to the Mk XVI part):

http://www.spitfire.dk/chapter3.htm

I always figured this happened because of the difference between British
manufacturing (production tolerances designed for hand-fitted assembly,
ie. not all pistons will fit well in all cylinders) vs American
manufacturing (production tolerances matched for mass production, ie.
all pistons will fit well enough in all cylinders).

Then again, the article I cited suggests it may have been a problem
limited to just one batch rather than the different industrial
philosophies between Henry T. and Henry Royce.

Was this thread about the F-35? :)

(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article >,
wrote:
:
:> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
:> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
:> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
:> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
:> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
:
:Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
:
:Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
:They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
:the early war versions.
:
:"US folk" cranked out so much hardware because there were more of
:us, we had more natural resources at hand, and we weren't being bombed.

Just as soon as you can convince me that handguns can stop tanks and
bombers I'll be more than happy to dismount. Until then, there is no
evidence that I am aware of that what you describe for small arms ever
happened with armor or airplanes.

As for the bombing, until something like the final six months of the
war German production was still going up. All the evidence I've heard
says we spent more bombing them than they spent trying to stop us and
fixing industry that we hit. This was true for RAF bombing (because
they just didn't hit much other than civilians very effectively) and
for US bombing (because our losses were so high going in in the
daytime).

--
"The way of the samurai is found in death. If by setting one's heart
right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his
body were already dead, he gains freedom in The Way. His whole life
will be without blame, and he will succeed in his calling."
-- "Hagakure Kikigaki", Yamamoto Tsunetomo

DeepSea wrote:

> "Brian Sharrock" > wrote in
> :
>
> >
> > "DeepSea" > wrote in message
> > . 136...
> >
> > snip
> >>
> >> > .... . The RAF bombers didn't do high altitude stuff, _most_
> >> of the bombing _against England was dive bombing_,
> >
> > Really? Please define _most_ and _dive_ bombing, in your statement.
> > FWIW, AIUI, _Dive_ bombers were used against the Chain Home sites at
> > the beginning of the Luftwaffe's Bombing campaign - and against such
> > defined sites the dive bombers would have been an appropriate resource
> > to task, but AFAIK the bombing campaigns against Liverpool, Coventry,
> > Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, London et.al were carried out at
> > night by waves of 'level' bombers. Your information may of course be
> > more accurate - I await your disclosures with interest.
>
> Maybe not. I'm not a historian, I'm an engineer with an interest in
> history. That being said, here's what I (think) I know.
>
> Most - (significantly) more than half
>
> Dive Bombing - technique that involves the release of bombs at high
> speed/low altitude.
>
> My comments are derived from a talk I attended last year while at the US
> Army's General Staff College. The talk was given by a British Army
> corporal who served as a courier in the early days of the Battle of
> Britain. He was wounded (badly) in one of the attacks, and spent the
> rest of the war recouperating and learning to walk again. He used the
> terms "most" and "dive bombing" during his talk. Over the course of
> about an hour and ten minutes, he described being on the recieving end
> of the German strikes. He only saw "level" bombing on one occasion
> (directed at an area target), but at a relatively low level, estimated
> to be less than 10,000 feet, and at night.

In respect of *the Battle of Britain* only it's possible that most of the
bombing ( on RAF fields ) may have been dive bombing.

The Blitz on London that followed ( and other bombing raids on various UK
cities ) most certainly wasn't the same however.

Graham

Ed Rasimus > wrote in
:

SNIP

>
> My point was the unusual nature of taking a general conclusion from a
> very limited anecdotal sampling and one that was arguably not an
> expert observer. It would be similar to taking testimony regarding an
> individual who has been shot and extrapolating their experience to
> some level of expertise in firearms.


I'm in trail with your point - and I agree with it, but in the absence
of everything else, you go with what you've got. The last few exchanges
have been an education. I disagree with your discounting a non-"expert
observer" in this case. I drive submarines for a living, and I'm certain
I can tell the difference between dive bombing and high altitude level
bombing when I see it; no reason to expect anything different from
anyone else.

>
> If you were in attendance at "the US Army's General Staff College"
> (can I assume you mean C&GSC?), then I would further assume a
> professional military background and some exposure during your
> educational background to some coverage of the Battle of Britain, the
> blitz, and the bombing of London.

The Battle of Britain was not covered at CGSC in any great detail as
part of the general course - you had to take an elective to get that,
one I was not able to take due to other requirements. The course is
joint oriented, and therefore is very effects based centric, especially
for those working out of rate, ie: a Navy guy like me working on an Army
staff in a traditionally green suiter role. We didn't really discuss the
technical aspects of various types of bomb delivery, and the effects of
the bombing, regardless of type, were more relevant to our discussions.
One of the lessons learned from Vietnam is that those kinds of details
are best left to the experts. During exercises/war-games, while acting
as the S3 of a joint staff, I wouldn't dream of requesting a certain
type of bomb delivery. I would discuss the effect I was trying to
achieve with the Strike Cell. The pilots, missileers and artillerymen
assigned to the cell would put the details together to create the
effect. While I can do the math and physics on a wide variety of
ordnance targeting and delivery, I don't have a good feel for what it
takes for the crews (at least air crews) to make it happen. While I'd
like to learn some of those details simply for professional development,
I much prefer the effects based planning, and I bet you would as well.
How would you like to be leading a squadron of your 105s on a strike
that had been planned by somebody who's complete exposure to the details
of air warfare included being certified as a private pilot, and had
numerous briefings and rides in a variety of tactical aircraft over the
course of his career?



>
> One could go a step further and, as Harry Andreas has pointed out,
> "high speed/low altitude" is probably not the best characterization of
> dive bombing either. Lay-down or skip-bombing display those attributes
> more accurately.

Agreed.


>
> Other than the oral history aspect of seeing a real live WW II British
> Tommy, what was the point of his presentation at C&GSC? Was this part
> of some larger program? Inquiring minds, etc. . . .

It was one part of a larger program - but one involving military history
- the recording of and study of, rather than any strategic, operational
or tactical application. The US Army has a rather rigorous approach to
history. They even have an officer skill designator for 'historian'.

DS




>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> www.thunderchief.org
> www.thundertales.blogspot.com

DeepSea wrote:

< snip >

> That would explain the British complaint with the early P-51's lack of
> high altitude performance. Based on the information I had, I (apparently
> incorrectly) assumed that there was no need for a fighter with good high
> altitude performance - I thought that most of the action during the BoB
> was down low where the early P-51 was actually pretty capable.

The Mustang didn't arrive 'til well long after the Battle of Britain, so the
point is moot anyway. Requirements would have moved on.

Graham

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

> In message >, Ricardo
> > writes
> >Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard built Merlin,
> >whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels of the Rolls Royce
> >version. This, it is claimed, was because the British kept secret the
> >composition of the phosphor-bronze bearings that they used in the
> >engine. No, I can't quote a source/s.
>
> On the other hand, I heard - from "old factory hands" lecturing on
> manufacturing technique at Highbury College in 1988 - that a big
> difference between Packard and Rolls-Royce was in fitting the cylinder
> head.
>
> Rolls-Royce used a precision hand-scraped metal-to-metal fit. Very
> effective, though extremely demanding in scarce skilled labour.
> (Attempting to 'file flat' is a useful exercise for a trainee mechanical
> engineer; it teaches a certain humility in demanding surface finishes)
>
> Packard cleaned up the castings, milled the mating faces approximately
> flat (at least, compared to a metal-metal seal) and put a gasket between
> them. I don't recall hearing tales of P-51s routinely or regularly
> falling from the skies when their engines failed, nor of the Packard
> Spitfires being execrated for unreliability (or, for that matter, lack
> of horsepower).

I think it's fair to say that Packard 'productionised' the design of the
Merlin which made it easier and quicker to build, possibly more reliable
too.

Graham

Ricardo wrote:

> At the height of the Battle of Britain the country's desperate need was
> for fighter aircraft - any fighter aircraft - hence purchases from
> American sources. However, by the time the early Mustang came on stream
> that particular battle was virtually over,

Entirely over by over a year in fact !

Graham

(Harry Andreas) wrote:

>In article >,
wrote:
>
>> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
>> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
>> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
>> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
>> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
>
>Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
>
>Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
>They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
>the early war versions.
>
>"US folk" cranked out so much hardware because there were more of
>us, we had more natural resources at hand, and we weren't being bombed.

Well, I don't know when mine was built but I do know that it
certainly was no precision piece of shootin 'arn for sure...it
worked ok but didn't look to be 'well made'
--

-Gord.
(use gordon in email)

Steve Hix wrote:
> In article >,
> Ricardo > wrote:
>
>
>>Steve Hix wrote:
>>
>>>In article >,
>>> Ricardo > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?
>>>
>>>
>>>In brief, a dive bomber based on the early P-51 airframe, officially
>>>named "Apache".
>>>
>>> - Three-blade rather than four-blade prop.
>>>
>>> - Allison V-1710 engine, rather than Allison Merlin, as used in
>>>original Mustang.
>>>
>>> - Dive brakes included on inboard underside of wings, similar to
>>>Douglas Dauntless.
>>>
>>>About 500 made, used mostly in CBI and Mediterranean/North African
>>>theaters.
>>>
>>>The Collings Foundation is restoring one in Florida.
>>
>>Thanks Steve,
>>
>>Each day we learn a little more...
>>
>>Ricardo
>>
>>PS Allison Merlin? - I thought Packard were the boys for the Merlin
>>production. Here I'm going to learn something else...
>
>
> Duuuh. Packard is right.
>
> I blame it on the poison oak what I got around my eyes currently.
>
> Glasses are a *good* thing...

So is doing it by feel...

Ricardo

"DeepSea" > wrote in message
. 136...
> Ed Rasimus > wrote in
> :
>
snip

>
> The discussion was not about "what dive bombing is all about", the
> technicalities or merits of dive bombing, nor was the talk. Simply that
> in his experience, he mostly saw dive bombing. This was important to my
> point of view because his talk was my only exposure to primary source
> material on the subject (at least until Brian posted the weblink).
>
>

The topic as been 'done to death' and You'll (Dep Sea) are probably
regretting the assertion that 'England was mostly sunjected to attack using
Dive-bombers :).
I can somewhat understand your inference as (apparently) you've only ever
experienced a talk from _one_ person that had endured aerial attack ( in
England?).
I'm a mid-War 'baby'. [My mother and her neighbours _might_ have been the
female ordnance workers clustered around the weapon shown on the Liverpool
Blitz website ... as they all were 'conscripted/drafted' for war work into
the Royal Ordnance Factory which was at Kirkby!]. I know and have been
exposed to primary source material off hundreds of relatives / neighbours
that survived the Blitz.

My playgrounds were the bombed sites (called Debris, pronounced deb-ree)
that surounded our homes. I can still 'hear' the cries of neighbours,
mothers and scuffers yelling 'Gerr'off that deb-ree!' to us kids.

Later whilst serving in the RAF, I was exposed to primary source material
from Pilots that had survived 'The War'. I was privileged to serve
with -that's probably best described as 'at the same station, during the
same time' - with 'Ginger Lacey'.

http://www.battle-of-britain.com/BoB2/Battle_personnel/Profiles/RAF/lacey.htm

One of the nicest man that one could encounter. (then) Flt. Lt. Lacey was
serving his 'last tour' as a (Master) Fighter Controller at RAF Buchan.
During the long midnight watches -as we anticipated the outbreak of WW1II -
we youngsters would listen enthralled to Flt. Lt. Lacey's recounting his
engagements. { I must stress that he was incredibly modest and
unassuming -it was we, youngsters, who pushed him into telling 'War-ies'. I
had a feeling of watching an updated 'Boyhood of Raleigh' scene with
'Ginger' playing the part of the oldster and the audience, the youngsters,
cluttered about the feet: albeit everybody was wearing air-force blue, and
the light was emanating off the Tote Board, Display Table and flickering
consoles.

This is the reason I felt that the original statement 'most ... dive
bombing' needed clarification.

--

Brian

In article >,
Ricardo > wrote:

> Steve Hix wrote:
> > In article >,
> > Ricardo > wrote:
> >
> >
> >>Steve Hix wrote:
> >>
> >>>In article >,
> >>> Ricardo > wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>What was the 'A-36' version of the Mustang?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>In brief, a dive bomber based on the early P-51 airframe, officially
> >>>named "Apache".
> >>>
> >>> - Three-blade rather than four-blade prop.
> >>>
> >>> - Allison V-1710 engine, rather than Allison Merlin, as used in
> >>>original Mustang.
> >>>
> >>> - Dive brakes included on inboard underside of wings, similar to
> >>>Douglas Dauntless.
> >>>
> >>>About 500 made, used mostly in CBI and Mediterranean/North African
> >>>theaters.
> >>>
> >>>The Collings Foundation is restoring one in Florida.
> >>
> >>Thanks Steve,
> >>
> >>Each day we learn a little more...
> >>
> >>Ricardo
> >>
> >>PS Allison Merlin? - I thought Packard were the boys for the Merlin
> >>production. Here I'm going to learn something else...
> >
> >
> > Duuuh. Packard is right.
> >
> > I blame it on the poison oak what I got around my eyes currently.
> >
> > Glasses are a *good* thing...
>
> So is doing it by feel...

Heh. That was my dad and uncle, who got horrible cases of poison oak
collecting pretty red leaves and ferns for table decorations while my
mom and aunt fixed dinner on a camping trip shortly after they got
married. A good two weeks before either could so much as touch their new
brides. Dad was always just a bit twitchy about camping after that; we
three kids didn't find out why until years later.

This time I got it from water that apparently had poison oak oil
(urushiol) on it splashed in my face while kayaking last week. Not the
first time I've gotten it without contacting the stupid plant at all.
Yay for spectacle; else I'd have had it in my eyes, rather than just
around them.

In article >,
(Brian Sharrock) wrote:

> Not much mention of Dive Bombers there! The Luftwaffe _did_
> have Dive-Bombers, these were aircraft specifically designed
> for Close-Air-Support of advancing troops

Just about all the Luftwaffe bombers including the He177 were
theoretically capable of dive bombing (stressed for it plus dive
brakes) however it seems that actual dive bombing was confined to
Stuka units due to the specialist training required.

Ken Young

In article >,
(Ricardo) wrote:

> Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard
> built Merlin, whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels
> of the Rolls Royce version. This, it is claimed, was because
> the British kept secret the composition of the phosphor-bronze
> bearings that they used in the engine.

The Packard Merlin did differ as far as I know but also as far
as I know it was not because of secrets. The British versions
were to closer tolerances requiring much more skill in assembly.
In "Sigh for a Merlin" a fault called skew gear failure was
traced to a difference in assembly order from Rolls Royce in one
of the (British) shadow factories.

Ken Young

"Jack Love" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 28 Apr 2006 15:04:23 -0700, (Harry
> Andreas) wrote:
>
>>In article >,
wrote:
>>
>>> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
>>> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
>>> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
>>> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
>>> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
>>
>
> And we kept a good handle on when 'good enough' was in fact good
> enough.

One of the extreme examples of this was the engine cooling fan on
tigers(?) - it was machined out of a single piece of aluminum. - Took lots
of precision machining.

US tanks had a standard car fan - stamped steel blades riveted to the
pulley. - Took 5 stamps, 10 rivets, and mumble mumble machining on the
pulley assembly. MUCH cheaper and easier.

wrote:
> In article >,
> (Ricardo) wrote:
>
>
>>Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard
>>built Merlin, whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels
>>of the Rolls Royce version. This, it is claimed, was because
>>the British kept secret the composition of the phosphor-bronze
>>bearings that they used in the engine.
>
>
> The Packard Merlin did differ as far as I know but also as far
> as I know it was not because of secrets. The British versions
> were to closer tolerances requiring much more skill in assembly.
> In "Sigh for a Merlin" a fault called skew gear failure was
> traced to a difference in assembly order from Rolls Royce in one
> of the (British) shadow factories.
>
In fact the Rolls Royce tolerances were rather looser than those
used by either the British Ford Motor Company or Packard. Rolls
Royce used hand fitting to match up parts, whereas Ford and Packard
were mass production companies which relied on close tolerances so
that parts were interchangeable without the laborious fitting and
adjusting that Rolls Royce used. The Rolls Royce system did require
a higher skill in assembly due to these fitting requirements.

Mike

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> Packard cleaned up the castings, milled the mating faces approximately
> flat (at least, compared to a metal-metal seal) and put a gasket between
> them. I don't recall hearing tales of P-51s routinely or regularly falling
> from the skies when their engines failed, nor of the Packard Spitfires
> being execrated for unreliability (or, for that matter, lack of
> horsepower).

A family friend, now departed, was a wrench-turner on (American)
Merlins during the war. He always said the Packard was easier to
work on, but did not take damage as well as, the RR version. His
reasoning was that, where RR might use (arbitrarily, as I can't recall
his exact words) 30 bolts spaced closely to attach an exhaust manifold,
Packard would use 20 spaced farther apart. He said that he saw
cases where Packard and Rolls-Royce engines would come back
with near-identical damage and the genuine article could still produce
power.


Jeff

My father-in-law had a similiar experience here in Canada. In circa
1942 he was an apprentice machinist for a new factory tasked with
manufacturing a British 4.5" naval gun design. IIRC, the original
British procedure for any shaft/bushing was to machine the shaft with
0.020 in interference and the hand file the shaft to fit. As he said,
there wasn't one in a hundred in their labour pool that could do this.
Part of his job was developing new dimensions and tolerances to allow
parts to be manufactured independently, inspected for dimensions, and
then assembled without further machining.

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Ricardo
> > writes
>>Incidentally, a few sources have claimed that the Packard built Merlin,
>>whilst a superb engine, lacked the power levels of the Rolls Royce
>>version. This, it is claimed, was because the British kept secret the
>>composition of the phosphor-bronze bearings that they used in the engine.
>>No, I can't quote a source/s.
>
> On the other hand, I heard - from "old factory hands" lecturing on
> manufacturing technique at Highbury College in 1988 - that a big
> difference between Packard and Rolls-Royce was in fitting the cylinder
> head.
>
> Rolls-Royce used a precision hand-scraped metal-to-metal fit. Very
> effective, though extremely demanding in scarce skilled labour.
> (Attempting to 'file flat' is a useful exercise for a trainee mechanical
> engineer; it teaches a certain humility in demanding surface finishes)
>

When I started work as an engineering apprentice at ICI they still
sealed the main steam joints on the turbines in the power station
this way. It isnt the file flat that's so time consuming as the
scraping of the surface until its flat according to the reference
surface plate.

They now use a lapping machine and gasket and its no less
reliable and a LOT quicker, plus I doubt there are many
fitters around with the skills to scrape joints flat any more.

Keith





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> wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> (DeepSea) wrote:
>
>> That is interesting - I had no idea that British interest is
>> what gave the P-51 its start.
>
> At the time Britain was buying every fighter they could get
> their hands on, including the Brewster Buffalo. British and
> French purchasing gave a major boost to the US aircraft industry.
> The first production orders for the Airacobra were from France.
>
> Ken Young
>

The first use of the Grumman Wildcat in combat was by
the Fleet Air Arm of the RN

Keith



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"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> wrote:
>
>> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
>> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
>> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
>> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
>> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
>
> Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
>
> Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
> They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
> the early war versions.
>

The German record was very mixed

They certainly become very efficient at manufacturing light weapons,
the MG-42 was a classic design that was simple , reliable and
excellent. Trouble is they also made plenty of monstrously complex
weapons systems. The Panther and Tiger tanks were examples of
technically advanced weapons that simply couldnt be cranked out in
the numbers needed due to the complexity of their manufacture.

> "US folk" cranked out so much hardware because there were more of
> us, we had more natural resources at hand, and we weren't being bombed.
>

Trouble is even Britain outproduced Germany for much of the war
with fewer natural resources and we WERE being bombed.
Bombing didnt seriously disrupt the German manufacture of weapons
until mid 1943 by which time the tide of war had turned. The allies
decided in many cases to accept technically inferior weapons
if they could be more easily mass produced

Compare Battle tank production in 1943

Germany 3,000 Mk 4, 3,800 Panthers, 650 Tigers
USA 21,000 M4 Sherman

Keith





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In article >, "Keith W"
> wrote:

> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >,
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
> >
> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
> >
> > Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
> > They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
> > the early war versions.
> >
>
> The German record was very mixed

Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective, and as
I pointed out, there are definite examples of German industry
reducing their quality standards to meet production demands.

cheers

PS: now that the Hobbit's (Rooney) out, what will England do?

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Harry Andreas wrote:

>
> PS: now that the Hobbit's (Rooney) out, what will England do?

Try and win some football without a spoilt brat throwing tantrums on the
pitch and verbally abusing the match officials when, rightly, he is
called to task.

In article >, Ricardo
> wrote:

> Harry Andreas wrote:
>
> >
> > PS: now that the Hobbit's (Rooney) out, what will England do?
>
> Try and win some football without a spoilt brat throwing tantrums on the
> pitch and verbally abusing the match officials when, rightly, he is
> called to task.

LOL!

Well, Ashley Cole looked all right today anyway.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article >, "Keith W"
> wrote:
:
:> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
:> ...
:> > In article >,
:> > wrote:
:> >
:> >> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
:> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
:> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
:> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
:> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
:> >
:> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
:> >
:> > Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
:> > They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
:> > the early war versions.
:> >
:>
:> The German record was very mixed
:
:Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
:but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
:"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
:That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective,

Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything",
since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the
hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be
cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't.

So object and be damned to you.


and as
:I pointed out, there are definite examples of German industry
:reducing their quality standards to meet production demands.
:
:cheers
:
:PS: now that the Hobbit's (Rooney) out, what will England do?

--
"So many women. So little charm."
-- Donna, to Josh; The West Wing

In sci.military.naval Keith W twisted the electrons to say:
> The Panther and Tiger tanks were examples of technically advanced
> weapons that simply couldnt be cranked out in the numbers needed due
> to the complexity of their manufacture.

The closest to "cheap and nasty" that I can think of on the tank front
for Germany would be the Panzer IV/L70 - due mainly to them no changing
the glacis plate like their did for the Jagdpanzer IV.
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...

In article >,
wrote:

> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>
> :In article >, "Keith W"
> > wrote:
> :
> :> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> :> ...
> :> > In article >,
> :> > wrote:
> :> >
> :> >> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
> :> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
> :> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
> :> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
> :> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
> :> >
> :> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
> :> >
> :> > Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
> :> > They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
> :> > the early war versions.
> :> >
> :>
> :> The German record was very mixed
> :
> :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
> :but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
> :"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
> :That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective,
>
> Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything",
> since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the
> hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be
> cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't.
>
> So object and be damned to you.

Dude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some things...
And I'll bet the Wehrmacht infantry would disagree with you about
big ticket items winning the war. As we know so well, boots on the
ground win the war, and boots on the ground are armed with rifles
and other "small" arms, the quality of which, as I pointed out in my
initial post, degraded substantially as the war progressed.
But I'm just an engineer who builds military equipment; what do I know.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

"Alistair Gunn" > wrote in message
. ..
> In sci.military.naval Keith W twisted the electrons to say:
>> The Panther and Tiger tanks were examples of technically advanced
>> weapons that simply couldnt be cranked out in the numbers needed due
>> to the complexity of their manufacture.
>
> The closest to "cheap and nasty" that I can think of on the tank front
> for Germany would be the Panzer IV/L70 - due mainly to them no changing
> the glacis plate like their did for the Jagdpanzer IV.
> --


I've seen estimates that put the price of a Tiger tank as $100,000 (US 1941)
as against $40,000 for a Panzer IV/L70, $ 50,000 for a Sherman M4A3(76) wet
and $80,000 for an M-26 Pershing

Keith



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On Fri, 5 May 2006 17:14:06 +0100, "Keith W"
> wrote:

>
>"Alistair Gunn" > wrote in message
. ..
>> In sci.military.naval Keith W twisted the electrons to say:
>>> The Panther and Tiger tanks were examples of technically advanced
>>> weapons that simply couldnt be cranked out in the numbers needed due
>>> to the complexity of their manufacture.
>>
>> The closest to "cheap and nasty" that I can think of on the tank front
>> for Germany would be the Panzer IV/L70 - due mainly to them no changing
>> the glacis plate like their did for the Jagdpanzer IV.
>> --
>
>
>I've seen estimates that put the price of a Tiger tank as $100,000 (US 1941)
>as against $40,000 for a Panzer IV/L70, $ 50,000 for a Sherman M4A3(76) wet
>and $80,000 for an M-26 Pershing

So...a Tiger was probably comparable to a P-38 ($115k 1945) to compare
apples and cantaloupes, or to give a technology figure of merit. And
nearing 10000 P-38s were built as opposed to 2000 Tigers...another of
those dumbfounders as to why were the Germans so hard to beat?



>Keith
>
>
>
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Jack Love wrote:

>>
>> I've seen estimates that put the price of a Tiger tank as $100,000
>> (US 1941) as against $40,000 for a Panzer IV/L70, $ 50,000 for a
>> Sherman M4A3(76) wet and $80,000 for an M-26 Pershing
>
> So...a Tiger was probably comparable to a P-38 ($115k 1945) to
> compare apples and cantaloupes, or to give a technology figure of
> merit. And nearing 10000 P-38s were built as opposed to 2000
> Tigers...another of those dumbfounders as to why were the Germans so
> hard to beat?
>

I believe that "man for man" the Wehrmacht was simply the toughest most
resourceful and dedicated fighting force of the modern era. They could
be overwhelmed, they could be outgeneraled, they could be cut off from
supplies. But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
forces where they were outfought. Why such skill and sacrifice was
expended in such an appalling cause should be debated at very high levels. .

But I've been to el alamein, normandy, Anzio, Cassino, Arnhem, the
Ardennes, Remagen, Berlin and many other battlefields. The sheer
technical skill and personal courage of the german forces is terrifying.

Vince

>
> WRT German dive bombing: the type most used for that was the JU-87 Stuka
> and they were such dead meat for the RAF that the Luftwaffe stopped sending
> them over early on in BoB.
>
> cheers
>
> --
> Harry Andreas
> Engineering raconteur

I know this not what you are really implying, but eneogh people will
read into this statement that I feel it should be mentioned.......
JU-87 & Dive bombing = TACTICAL CAS
Battle of Britain = STRATEGIC bombing
While an improved ability to survive fighters was found to be desirable
for CAS aircraft, useing the BOB as an example of why not to build
dedicated CAS aircraft (don't laugh, the USAF has done exactly that
multiple times) is BOGUS. Stukas did poorly in the BOB after doing well
in the low countries becouse it was a completly differnt mission and
tactical environment then one for which it was designed and trained
for, not becouse it was newly obsolete to the mighty british technology
advancements.
Reed

(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article >,
wrote:
:
:> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
:>
:> :In article >, "Keith W"
:> > wrote:
:> :
:> :> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
:> :> ...
:> :> > In article >,
:> :> > wrote:
:> :> >
:> :> >> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war.
:> :> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy
:> :> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let
:> :> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
:> :> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
:> :> >
:> :> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
:> :> >
:> :> > Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
:> :> > They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
:> :> > the early war versions.
:> :> >
:> :>
:> :> The German record was very mixed
:> :
:> :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
:> :but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
:> :"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
:> :That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective,
:>
:> Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything",
:> since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the
:> hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be
:> cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't.
:>
:> So object and be damned to you.
:
:Dude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
:disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some things...

Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> Vince wrote:
> > I believe that "man for man" the Wehrmacht was simply the toughest most
> > resourceful and dedicated fighting force of the modern era. They could
> > be overwhelmed, they could be outgeneraled, they could be cut off from
> > supplies. But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
> > forces where they were outfought.
>
> Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
> good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
> how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at least,
> be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).
>
> Sydney Jary - hindered by the baggage of actually having commanded an
> infantry platoon for some months 1944-45 - was less impressed with the
> German infantry skills, which he saw as repetition of opening fire, then
> disengaging before the assault came in.
>
> > But I've been to el alamein, normandy, Anzio, Cassino, Arnhem, the
> > Ardennes, Remagen, Berlin and many other battlefields. The sheer
> > technical skill and personal courage of the german forces is terrifying.
>
> Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
> expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
> Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced with
> assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First Alamein or
> even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.
>
>
> --
> He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
> Julius Caesar I:2
>
> Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Given the date on your posting 4:06 am on May 7 please inform me as to
which horse won the kentucky Derby!


50
From: Paul J. Adam - view profile
Date: Sun, May 7 2006 4:06 am
Email: "Paul J. Adam" >
Groups: sci.military.naval, rec.aviation.military,
rec.aviation.military.naval
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Vince wrote:
> I believe that "man for man" the Wehrmacht was simply the toughest most
> resourceful and dedicated fighting force of the modern era. They could
> be overwhelmed, they could be outgeneraled, they could be cut off from
> supplies. But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
> forces where they were outfought.

Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at least,
be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> Vince wrote:
>> I believe that "man for man" the Wehrmacht was simply the toughest most
>> resourceful and dedicated fighting force of the modern era. They could
>> be overwhelmed, they could be outgeneraled, they could be cut off from
>> supplies. But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
>> forces where they were outfought.
>
> Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
> good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
> how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at least,
> be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).
>

once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had
overwhelming strength at any point. The German defense was tenacious
and skill full and if Hitler had not interfered, far more of the German
forces could have been withdrawn.

> Sydney Jary - hindered by the baggage of actually having commanded an
> infantry platoon for some months 1944-45 - was less impressed with the
> German infantry skills, which he saw as repetition of opening fire, then
> disengaging before the assault came in.
>
>> But I've been to el alamein, normandy, Anzio, Cassino, Arnhem, the
>> Ardennes, Remagen, Berlin and many other battlefields. The sheer
>> technical skill and personal courage of the german forces is terrifying.
>
> Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
> expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
> Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced with
> assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First Alamein or
> even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.
>

the Kursk was simply overwhelmingly strong. The Battle of Prokhorovka
Showed the fundamental German problem. About 200 German armored
fighting vehicles confront about 500 Russian , inflict far more losses
than they sustain, but are unable to make good the losses and have to
retreat
(yes I know there are controversies over the numbers)

Vince

On Sat, 06 May 2006 09:09:05 -0400, Vince wrote:
Follow-up to set to sci.military.naval

>Paul J. Adam wrote:

> once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had
> overwhelming strength at any point.

Okay, so the Western Allies launch an opposed amphibious assault into
prepared positions, then attack through excellent defensive terrain
against a determined defense, deal with several massed panzer attacks
without giving ground, and eventually break out of the lodgment and
liberate most of France. Mostly with divisions that had never been in
combat before, against a number of experienced German divisions (and some
understrength, weaker divisions, to be sure). All of this in just about
three months, and at just about equal cost (ignoring the 200,000 or so
German POW's, just looking at killed/missing/wounded the numbers are
roughly even).

This somehow supports the argument that the Germans fought better?

>>And when the Germans were faced with
>> assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First Alamein or
>> even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.

Not just extensively-prepared defenses. Even a cursory examination of the
experiences of Sixth SS Panzer Army at the Bulge would suggest that, at
least in that case, the Germans were unable to perform even with massive
material superiority. I mean, when a Panzer army is attacking just a bit
more than one tired infantry division and is held up for the better part
of two days, you can't say that the Army outfought the division.

Chris Manteuffel
--
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..." -Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
Email spamtrapped. Try chris@(my last name).name

On Fri, 05 May 2006 16:58:31 -0400, Vince wrote:
Follow-up to set to sci.military.naval

> But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
> forces where they were outfought.

I suggest you read _When the Odds were Even_ by Bonn, about the Vosges
campaign. Little known here in the US, because 7th Army didn't get the
press that the Patton-Bradley-Monty triumvirate got, but a quite effective
assault, across excellent defensive terrain, with little air support,
by essentially even troop strengths.

Why is it difficult to find out information on this campaign? The popular
understanding of the 1944-1945 campaign is badly skewed by the
emphasis on Anglo-American rivalry. As H.P. Wilmott pointed out, most
English-language accounts of that campaign make it seem that the Americans
and the British are the chief antagonists. Because of that focus, the
operations of 6th Army Group, critical as the were, are only lightly
touched on, usually just in a "FDR vs. Churchill: Dragoon vs. Italy"
context. The importance of Marseilles is ignored so that the blame game
over Antwerp can be played, and the attention focuses on the twin failures
of Huertgen and Market Garden, rather than the success of the Vosges.

Chris Manteuffel
--
"...the war situation has developed not necessarily
to Japan's advantage..." -Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945
Email spamtrapped. Try chris@(my last name).name

Paul J. Adam wrote:

56
From: Paul J. Adam - view profile
Date: Sun, May 7 2006 2:03 pm
Email: "Paul J. Adam" >
Groups: sci.military.naval, rec.aviation.military,
rec.aviation.military.naval
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>
> Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Can I again point out that you are posting some 24 hours in the future?
There is a significant horse race on in four hours that could make a
small piece of change for both of us if you can look up who won the
Kentucky Derby in your yesterday and slip the word back in time? None
of us will tell how you did it.

Jack Linthicum wrote:
> Paul J. Adam wrote:
>
> 56
> From: Paul J. Adam - view profile
> Date: Sun, May 7 2006 2:03 pm

> Can I again point out that you are posting some 24 hours in the future?

Just rebuilt my PC after the motherboard decided to commit seppuku;
looks like the system date was wrong. Should be fixed now.


--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> Jack Linthicum wrote:
> > Paul J. Adam wrote:
> >
> > 56
> > From: Paul J. Adam - view profile
> > Date: Sun, May 7 2006 2:03 pm
>
> > Can I again point out that you are posting some 24 hours in the future?
>
> Just rebuilt my PC after the motherboard decided to commit seppuku;
> looks like the system date was wrong. Should be fixed now.
>
>
> --
> He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
> Julius Caesar I:2
>
> Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Rats

On Sun, 07 May 2006 19:03:00 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>Vince wrote:
>> Paul J. Adam wrote:
>>> Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
>>> good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
>>> how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at
>>> least, be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).
>>
>> once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had
>> overwhelming strength at any point.
>
>Not really, no: we were landing and supplying forces across beaches,
>subject to the caprices of Channel weather (which could be, and was,
>very nasty), and pitting inexperienced troops against veterans on
>terrain they'd had time to prepare.

The odds against on Overlord were very significant, but to give the
forward German divisions full 'veteran' status is probably overmuch,
many were 'white bread' garrison troops and not really that good.
But, the oft discussed medium deep maneuver reserve concept was just
plain bad, ObWest should have known better by then and been able to
count airplanes adequately to know the odds of a successful
counterattack response against that kind of tactical airpower as near
zero. Once again we owe a heck of a lot to Fuehrer 'intuition'.

>Certainly the men who seized the Odon crossings, held off
>counter-attacks by elements of six panzer divisions, drew in the German
>strategic reserves, and withstood the attacks that were supposed to
>break them, would disagree that they had "overwhelming strength", but
>their success suggests that the Wehrmacht had similar difficulties
>attacking in Normandy countryside as anyone else (it was the inability
>of the Germans to destroy 15th Scots, despite throwing in their entire
>reserve, that led Rommel on 29 June to propose a fighting retreat to the
>Seine)
>
>
>>> Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
>>> expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
>>> Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced
>>> with assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First
>>> Alamein or even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.
>
>> the Kursk was simply overwhelmingly strong.
>
>Perhaps a maxim of excellent soldiers is "don't attack where the enemy
>has built seven layers of defensive lines precisely in order to defeat
>your plan"? While the Germans were good at "mission command" at lower
>ranks, their commanders - with a few exceptions - ranged from spineless
>to clueless.

Indeed, do pay attention: the enemy may have a plan of his own.

>Mind you, when a senior Wehrmacht officer admitted to an inconvenient
>truth, he could find himself out of a job very fast (cf von Rundstedt in
>July 1944, telling Keitel that Germany's strategic options in the West
>consisted of 'Make peace, you fools!' and being promptly replaced by von
>Kluge) which has to be included in any assessment of their ability.

On Sat, 06 May 2006 19:31:02 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>Jack Linthicum wrote:
>> Paul J. Adam wrote:
>>
>> 56
>> From: Paul J. Adam - view profile
>> Date: Sun, May 7 2006 2:03 pm
>
>> Can I again point out that you are posting some 24 hours in the future?
>
>Just rebuilt my PC after the motherboard decided to commit seppuku;
>looks like the system date was wrong. Should be fixed now.

Damn. I was hoping that we could make some money on TVG, here!!! ;-)


Bill Kambic
Haras Lucero, Kingston, TN
Mangalarga Marchador: Uma Raça, Uma Paixão

wrote:

:On Sat, 06 May 2006 19:31:02 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
:
:>Jack Linthicum wrote:
:>>
:>> Can I again point out that you are posting some 24 hours in the future?
:>
:>Just rebuilt my PC after the motherboard decided to commit seppuku;
:>looks like the system date was wrong. Should be fixed now.
:
:Damn. I was hoping that we could make some money on TVG, here!!! ;-)

I just figured he'd accidentally walked into the wrong police call box
to connect up....

Vince wrote:
> I believe that "man for man" the Wehrmacht was simply the toughest most
> resourceful and dedicated fighting force of the modern era. They could
> be overwhelmed, they could be outgeneraled, they could be cut off from
> supplies. But it is very difficult to find cases of equal strength
> forces where they were outfought.

Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at least,
be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).

Sydney Jary - hindered by the baggage of actually having commanded an
infantry platoon for some months 1944-45 - was less impressed with the
German infantry skills, which he saw as repetition of opening fire, then
disengaging before the assault came in.

> But I've been to el alamein, normandy, Anzio, Cassino, Arnhem, the
> Ardennes, Remagen, Berlin and many other battlefields. The sheer
> technical skill and personal courage of the german forces is terrifying.

Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced with
assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First Alamein or
even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.


--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>
> :In article >,
> wrote:
> :
> :> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
> :>
> :> :In article >, "Keith W"
> :> > wrote:
> :> :
> :> :> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> :> :> ...
> :> :> > In article >,
> :> :> > wrote:
> :> :> >
> :> :> >> Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the
war.
> :> :> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us
sloppy
> :> :> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because
we let
> :> :> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled
> :> :> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages.
> :> :> >
> :> :> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far.
> :> :> >
> :> :> > Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser?
> :> :> > They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to
> :> :> > the early war versions.
> :> :> >
> :> :>
> :> :> The German record was very mixed
> :> :
> :> :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things,
> :> :but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany,
> :> :"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards".
> :> :That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective,
> :>
> :> Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything",
> :> since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the
> :> hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be
> :> cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't.
> :>
> :> So object and be damned to you.
> :
> :Dude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
> :disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some things...
>
> Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...

"Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German production.
Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The Wehrmacht's besetting sin was
not demanding superior (and useless) manufacturing standards. The main
problems were 1. refusal to stop changing designs and 2. not fully
mobilizing for production until 'way too late.

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making
changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made
logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given
overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war
(1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out
of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam
Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a
side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally
hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.

Paul F Austin wrote:
> "Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
> ...
>> (Harry Andreas) wrote:
>>
>> :In article >,
>> wrote: : :> (Harry
>> Andreas) wrote: :> :> :In article
>> >, "Keith W" :>
>> > wrote: :> : :> :> "Harry
>> Andreas" > wrote in message :> :>
>> ... :> :> > In article
>> >, :> :> >
>> wrote: :> :> > :> :> >> Note that this is
>> sort of the same approach that lost Germany the
> war.
>> :> :> >> Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while
>> us
> sloppy
>> :> :> >> folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could
>> because
> we let
>> :> :> >> the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the
>> skilled :> :> >> 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages. :> :> > :>
>> :> > Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far. :> :> > :> :> >
>> Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser? :> :> >
>> They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to :>
>> :> > the early war versions. :> :> > :> :> :> :> The German record
>> was very mixed :> : :> :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who
>> have said similar things, :> :but I still object to Mr McCall's
>> statement that, in Germany, :> :"Everything was hand-finished to
>> very high standards". :> :That's just not true. As you point out,
>> it was very selective, :> :> Yes. The big ticket items (which was
>> what I meant by "everything", :> since that is what wars are
>> actually fought and won with) got all the :> hand finishing. Small
>> stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be :> cheap and 'throw
>> away' generally weren't. :> :> So object and be damned to you. :
>> :Dude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
>> :disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some
>> things...
>>
>> Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...
>>
>
> "Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German
> production. Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The
> Wehrmacht's besetting sin was not demanding superior (and useless)
> manufacturing standards. The main problems were 1. refusal to stop
> changing designs and 2. not fully mobilizing for production until
> 'way too late.
>
> The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
> making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
> important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
> until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
> years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
> by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
> the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
> peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
> Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
> types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
> carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.
>
>

They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

Vince

Vince wrote:
[snip]

>
> Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
> continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
> the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
> for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.

One short war = short war
Lots of short wars = long time at war.

Weapons and ammunition used need replacing.

Blair and Bush need this explaining.

Andrew Swallow

Vince wrote:
> Paul J. Adam wrote:
>> Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
>> good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
>> how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at
>> least, be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).
>
> once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had
> overwhelming strength at any point.

Not really, no: we were landing and supplying forces across beaches,
subject to the caprices of Channel weather (which could be, and was,
very nasty), and pitting inexperienced troops against veterans on
terrain they'd had time to prepare.

Certainly the men who seized the Odon crossings, held off
counter-attacks by elements of six panzer divisions, drew in the German
strategic reserves, and withstood the attacks that were supposed to
break them, would disagree that they had "overwhelming strength", but
their success suggests that the Wehrmacht had similar difficulties
attacking in Normandy countryside as anyone else (it was the inability
of the Germans to destroy 15th Scots, despite throwing in their entire
reserve, that led Rommel on 29 June to propose a fighting retreat to the
Seine)


>> Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
>> expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
>> Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced
>> with assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First
>> Alamein or even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.

> the Kursk was simply overwhelmingly strong.

Perhaps a maxim of excellent soldiers is "don't attack where the enemy
has built seven layers of defensive lines precisely in order to defeat
your plan"? While the Germans were good at "mission command" at lower
ranks, their commanders - with a few exceptions - ranged from spineless
to clueless.

Mind you, when a senior Wehrmacht officer admitted to an inconvenient
truth, he could find himself out of a job very fast (cf von Rundstedt in
July 1944, telling Keitel that Germany's strategic options in the West
consisted of 'Make peace, you fools!' and being promptly replaced by von
Kluge) which has to be included in any assessment of their ability.



--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Vince" > wrote in message
...
> Paul F Austin wrote:
> >
> > The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
> > making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
> > important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
> > until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
> > years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
> > by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
> > the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
> > peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
> > Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
> > types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
> > carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.
> >
> >
>
> They had lots of problems
> From the strategic bombing survey
>
> Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
> great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
> few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
> and the average work week was below British standards.
>
> Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
> continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
> the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
> for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
> Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
> 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
> inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
> armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
> be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
> suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
> years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
> government management in Germany was not efficient."

It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
> wrote:

>
>"Vince" > wrote in message
...
>> Paul F Austin wrote:
>> >
>> > The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
>> > making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
>> > important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
>> > until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
>> > years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
>> > by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
>> > the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
>> > peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
>> > Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
>> > types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
>> > carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> They had lots of problems
>> From the strategic bombing survey
>>
>> Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
>> great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
>> few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
>> and the average work week was below British standards.
>>
>> Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
>> continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
>> the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
>> for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
>> Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
>> 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
>> inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
>> armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
>> be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
>> suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
>> years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
>> government management in Germany was not efficient."
>
>It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
>War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
>Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
>were....empty. Oops.
>

And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.

Jack Love wrote:

> On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Vince" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> Paul F Austin wrote:
> >> >
> >> > The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
> >> > making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
> >> > important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
> >> > until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
> >> > years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
> >> > by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
> >> > the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
> >> > peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
> >> > Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
> >> > types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
> >> > carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >> They had lots of problems
> >> From the strategic bombing survey
> >>
> >> Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
> >> great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
> >> few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
> >> and the average work week was below British standards.
> >>
> >> Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
> >> continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
> >> the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
> >> for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
> >> Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
> >> 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
> >> inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
> >> armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
> >> be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
> >> suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
> >> years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
> >> government management in Germany was not efficient."
> >
> >It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
> >War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
> >Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
> >were....empty. Oops.
> >
>
> And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
> have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
> to winning the war.

They're hardly the only ones to suffer from that misconception (cough).

Guy

In article >,
(Paul F Austin) wrote:

> The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production
> designs, making changes constantly

On the other hand failing to change production had it's
drawbacks. Britain ended up producing 1,771 tanks that were only
ever used for training, the Covenanter. The Sherman was
continuously upgraded by the way.

A lot of the German changes were intended to make production
easier by the way. The MG 42 was introduced because producing it
required less man hours than the MG 34.

Ken Young

wrote:

> On the other hand failing to change production had it's
> drawbacks. Britain ended up producing 1,771 tanks that were only
> ever used for training, the Covenanter.

However, the Covenanter went through four marks during its production
run in (repeated, unsuccessful) efforts to solve its chronic overheating
problem, so "failing to change production" doesn't really apply there.


--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk